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1 Introduction
Robert Solow once said that one of the few good ways to test analytical
ideas is to see whether they can make sense of international diﬀerences in
institutional structure and historical development. This paper follows that
advise, as do most of the large literature aimed at explaining the unusual
and persistent increase in the unemployment rate from the 1970s in virtually
all western capitalist economies.
In the 1970s the discussion was dominated by a shock story. Supply
shocks of the 1970s and 1980s and the contractional macroeconomic policies
to fight inflation were blamed for unemployment. But shocks across countries
are not likely to vary enough to explain the observed diﬀerences in labour
market performance. And the eﬀect of shocks on unemployment is in any
case temporary. Then how can one explain the persistence on the one hand
and the diﬀerent unemployment experiences across countries on the other?
The focus moved to labour market institutions, ignoring shocks all to-
gether sometimes. But the ”usual suspects”, the unemployment insurance
system, the employment protection legislation or the union power were al-
ready in place when European unemployment was below the North-American
one. There are three possible answers to that. First, labour market rigidities
have become worse over time. It is true that some institutions, as the benefit
insurance system or the tax wedge, have grown consistently in most OECD
countries.1 But others such as employment protection legislation or union
density have decreased in the last decade (after an initial period of increase).
The second way out could be that labour market rigidities impact on labour
performance with a lag. The rise of unemployment in the early 70s could be
then the result of rigidities introduced in the market ten years before.
The third answer, however, is lately the most popular: labour market
rigidities were not so important in the past because there were no adverse
shocks. Diﬀerences in labour market outcomes must be due to diﬀerences in
the way that countries respond to similar shocks, which depends ultimately
on the country specific institutions. It is the interaction of shocks with in-
stitutions what can explain the persistence of the shocks and the diﬀerent
labour market performance evolution across economies, after being hit by
1By ”increase” or ”growth” of institutions it is meant a change that makes labour
markets more ”rigid” as could be an extension of the time unemployed receive benefits or
an increase in the tax wedge. The opposite holds with ”decrease”.
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similar shocks. The first economists in picking this idea up were Michael
Bruno and Jeﬀrey Sacks in their 1985 book The Economics of Worldwide
Stagflation where they focused on the interaction of the 1970s oil price shocks
with the nature of collective bargaining.
This paper is intended to make a contribution to this line of research. The
contribution is twofold. First, the impact of a general feature of developed
economies that has been surprisingly neglected in the literature is analyzed,
namely, the employment shift from industry and agriculture to services. The
second contribution of the paper is the focus on the interaction of that shock
with the administrative burdens on firm creation, start-up costs from now
on.
The working hypotheses is that countries which impose high costs on the
creation of new companies are not able to create enough jobs in the service
sector to successfully absorb the workers released from the agriculture and
industry sector. The result is higher unemployment.
The employment shift towards the service sector is a very well documented
fact. Viktor Fuchs published in 1968 his path-breaking study The Service
Economy. Around that time, Baumol published in the American Economic
Review his paper ”Unbalanced Growth,” where the possible causes of the
wide-spread shift of labour from industry and agriculture to the service sector
were laid out.2
Baumol sorted economic activities into two groups: technologically pro-
gressive activities in which innovations, capital accumulation and economies
of scale lead to increases in labour productivity (production sector); and
constant productivity activities where labour is not a mean but the end so
innovation can hardly increase productivity (service sector). The increase
in labour productivity in the former sector brings in an increase in wages
that is then spread to the overall economy. The constant productivity sector
cannot compensate the rise in wages so production costs and prices increase.
There are several eﬀects at stake. First, the labour productivity growth is
generating wealth that will be spent in services and non-services. Second,
the relative increase in the service prices is inducing people to substitute
away from services. As long as the substitution eﬀect is not ”too large”
(the service demand is price-inelastic), the overall demand for services will
2See also [2] where a third sector of ”asymptocally stagnation”, with a mix of progressive
and stagnant inputs, was introduced. In [11] Baumol’s unbalanced growth and Kaldor’s
balcanced growth are reconcile.
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not decrease. To keep production in a sector with constant or decreasing
productivity, labour has to be shifted from the high productivity sector.
Figure 1 shows the unweighted OECD average of manufacturing to service
labour productivity and manufacturing to service price deflator. The pattern
shown, which reproduces nicely Baumol predictions, is a feature of every
country in the sample.
 
period beginning...
 Maf. to Sv. LProd. trend  Mf. to Sv. price index
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
0.91
1.47
Figure 1: Manufacturing to service labour productivity and price index. Av-
erage OECD
Following Baumol we claim that the employment shift into services was
the outcome of an exogenous shock: the slower productivity growth in ser-
vices relative to non-service sectors. This approach is consistent with the
arguments linking total factor productivity growth slowdown with unem-
ployment but it emphasizes the diﬀerential productivity growth in services
and the rest of the economy.3 Rather than on the overall fall in the supply or
demand of jobs, the focus is on the shift of jobs and workers from non-service
to service activities.
Figure 2 shows the annualized growth from 1970 to 1997 of total employ-
ment compared to the annualized growth of working age population (WAP)
3See [27] and more recently [7]. The argument is that the slowdown in total productivity
growth has not been matched with a slowdown of wages and therefore unemployment has
increased.
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in seven OECD countries and the EU average.
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WAP 1.17 2.47 0.66 1.15 1.54 0.45 2.11 1.23
Total employment 0.46 1.95 0.24 1.60 0.25 0.50 3.59 0.88
Empl. corrected by WAP -0.71 -0.52 -0.42 0.45 -1.29 0.05 1.48 -0.34
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Figure 2: Employment and working age population (WAP) annualized
growth, in %. 1970-97
Only Japan, the UK and the USA were able to create enough jobs to
compensate for the increase in working age population. Spain had an unfor-
tunate combination of very poor employment growth and rather high increase
in working age population. The question is, what is behind those diﬀerences
in employment growth? Figure 3 shows the annualized contribution of each
economic sector to total employment growth. The sector contributions are
calculated as the annualized sector employment growth weighted by the sec-
tor’s initial share of total employment.
Service employment growth accounts for most of the employment growth.
The poor employment performance of Spain is the result of a very large re-
lease of workers from the agriculture, and to a lesser extent from the industry
sector, along with a below average service job creation. The impressive per-
formance of the USA is due to an incredible ability to create jobs in the
service sector and of a very limited (none) loss of employment in the non-
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Agriculture -0.48 -0.24 -0.73 -0.59 -1.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.43
Industry -0.64 0.00 -0.34 0.38 -0.23 -0.86 0.28 -0.38
Services 1.58 2.19 1.30 1.80 1.50 1.42 3.32 1.69
Total employment 0.46 1.95 0.24 1.60 0.25 0.50 3.59 0.88
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Figure 3: Annualized sector contribution to employment growth, in %. 1970-
97
service sectors. Marimon and Zilibotti [1998] calculated that almost 80% of
the long-run employment diﬀerential growth across countries and industries
is accounted by sector eﬀects (diﬀerent initial distribution of labour across
industries) and only 20% by country eﬀects.
The inability of the major European economies to create enough jobs to
absorb the increasing supply of labour has been well documented. Krueger
and Pischke [1997], for example, decompose the growth of employment be-
tween population growth and other reasons and show that population growth
in Europe does not create jobs at the same rate as it does in USA. They go
further in the paper and claim that the reason for this is not, as usually
believed, Europe’s wage rigidity. That explanation would imply that unem-
ployment would have to increase most in Europe among groups whose wages
have fallen most in USA. But that is not the case: the unemployment rate of
the low-skilled group of workers (relative to the high-skilled one) is roughly
the same in Europe and the United States. Krueger and Pischke rather sug-
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gest that the problem is the existence of restrictions on bringing new products
to the market or on starting new businesses. When these restrictions are in
place, the increase in labour supply is not traduced in an equivalent increase
in the number of employers, and unemployment results.
This brings us to the second contribution of this paper, which is to re-
late the inability to create ”enough” service jobs in some countries to their
institutions governing firm creation and other product market regulations.
The 1994 McKinsey Global Institute report ”Employment Performance”
was perhaps the first study which claimed that product market regulations,
as opposed to labour market regulations, were very important in explaining
poor job creation in the service sector in Europe. Also in 1994, the OECD
Jobs Study aﬃrmed that ”new jobs are likely to appear in the service sec-
tor, which already accounts for more than half of total employment in most
OECD countries(..). New jobs must certainly be generated by the private
sector, because in nearly all countries budget deficits and resistance to tax
increases rule out significant expansion of the public sector (...). Eﬀorts to im-
prove the capacity of economies to create jobs should focus on facilitating the
development and use of technology; working time flexibility; encouragement
of entrepreneurship and a general review of policies that may be hampering
job creation.”4
The OECD went further in this direction publishing in 1998 a monograph
titled ”Fostering Entrepreneurship.” They also have very recently published
comparable data on product market regulations (details are given in the next
section) and consistent data on firm dynamics for 10 OECD countries. The
paper by Scarpetta et al. [2002] is an extremely recent application of both
data-sets. In that paper the authors test the role that policy and institu-
tional settings in product and labour markets play for productivity and firm
dynamics. They find that industry productivity performance is negatively
aﬀected by strict product market regulations. The second important finding
is that more cumbersome regulation on entrepreneurial activity and costs of
adjusting the workforce seem to negatively aﬀect the entry of new small firms
and their posterior expansion.
The current paper claims that countries which suﬀered the biggest rise
in unemployment are the ones that failed to provide policies and institutions
that were conductive to the employment in services. A key policy in this
4The italics are mine. See the electronic version of [22] at
http://www1.oecd.org/sge/min/job94/tabcont.htm
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respect is the regulation of business openings. Service employment occurs on
average in smaller and more decentralized establishments than manufacturing
and successful new job creation in services requires the setting up of new
companies.5 Countries where starting a business is cumbersome have failed
to accommodate the employment shift from manufacturing and agriculture
into services, at the cost of higher unemployment.
The paper follows very closely the methodology used by Blanchard and
Wolfers in their highly acknowledge paper of 2000 (that paper will be referred
as B&W from now on). In that paper the authors use a panel of 20 countries
to explain the evolution of unemployment in the OECD from the 1960s via the
interaction of shocks and institutions. The shocks included are the decrease
in annual TFP growth, the increase in long-term interest rate, and the shift
in labour demand. The institutions include the unemployment insurance
system, the cost of hiring and firing, wage bargaining characteristics and
active labour market policies.
Taking as a starting point the B&W model, we substitute the aggregate
TFP growth by the diﬀerential productivity growth in manufacturing and
services, and add one institution, namely, start-up costs. The purpose is to
test whether start-up costs, when interacted with the shift of employment
from non-services to services, can explain the poor service employment per-
formance and high unemployment rate of some countries.
The next section describes with some detail the data used in the estima-
tions. Section three explains the methodology and empirical results. Section
four concludes.
2 Dat a Des cri pti on
A panel data-set building on the one constructed and analyzed by B&W has
been put together.6 We drew data from B&W for unemployment, labour
market institutions and shocks. Product Market Indicators from the OECD
were added. The three macroeconomic shocks of B&W were complemented
5In 1995 the average service firm size in the Eurpean Union was of 5 employees, as
compared to 16 employees in industry and energy. The data for United States is in 1997
of 21 and 56 employees respectively. As Scarpetta et al. [2002] confirm in their paper,
American entrant firms are smaller than European ones but then expand much more.
6Both the data-set and the original Stata program are available in Olivier Blanchard’s
or Justin Wolfer’s web-page. Please refer to their work for technical details concerning the
construction of the variables.
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Countries Change in Change in service
unemployment: 1970-97 employment: 1970-97
France 7.37 8.73
Germany 8.79 8.88
Italy 7.77 8.62
Spain 19.99 6.23
UK 5.35 11.19
USA .09 14.45
Japan 1.94 11.40
Source: OECD Annual Labour Force
Note: Unemployment is expressed in % of labor force.
Service employment is in % of working age population
Table 1: Change in unemployment and service employment, in percentage
with a fourth shock intended to capture the sectorial shift from non-service to
service activities over the last decades. An unbalanced data-set is available
for 20 OECD countries along 28 years, from 1970 to 1997.7 The countries
included in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway,
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and
United States.
There are three dependent variables: unemployment rate, service and
manufacturing employment ratios. All data come from the OECD annual
Labour Force Survey. Unemployment numbers are those gathered in the
National Labour Force surveys. Service employment comprises civilian em-
ployment employed in sectors such as wholesale and retail trade; restaurants
and hotels; transport, storage and communications; financing, insurance, real
state and business services; and community, social and personal services. We
have also carried out the regressions using industry civilian employment in-
stead of manufacturing employment; the results are very robust.
Table 1, shows the change from 1970 to 1997 of unemployment and service
employment in the United States, Japan and five large European countries:
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK.
Countries that experienced the most limited increases in service employ-
7Blanchard and Wolfers [2000] work with a data-set that covers the period 1960-1997.
However, the unavailability of data on sector employment, production and price indexes
in earlier years made it advisable to reduce the observation period to 1970-1997.
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ment over the period 1970-97, like Spain or Italy, are also the ones that
suﬀered the largest increases in unemployment in the same period. Indeed,
the correlation between both growth rates (using all countries in the panel)
is of (-0.7). That correlation encourages further research to understand why
service employment did not increase as much in some countries and to what
extent that explains the diﬀerent unemployment experiences across countries.
2.1 Institutions
2.1.1 Labour Market institutions
Data for labour market institutions come originally from Nickell [1997]. Nick-
ell presents averages of eight labour market institutions for 1983-1988 and
for 1989-1994. B&W use the average of both periods as the time-constant
value of each labour market institution. We discuss briefly the definitions.
• Employment Protection Legislation (EPL): The source of the index is
the OECD Jobs Studies published in 1994. The OECD ranked countries
according to the legal framework governing firing and hiring. The index
is the ranking of 20 countries, 20 indicating the most strictly regulated
country. The OECD measure comprises characteristics both of the
individual and collective contract termination. That includes features
as notice time and financial compensation, rights to appeal against
termination or administrative procedures.
• Benefit Replacement Rate: Gross benefits for a single person under
50, expressed as percentage of the most relevant wage (normally gross
wage).
• Benefit Duration: It captures how long the unemployed are entitled to
receive unemployment insurance. It is expressed in years. Four or more
years are considered infinite duration.
• Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP): It refers to expenditures on
activities for the unemployed that are aimed at helping them back into
work. The numbers are expenditure per unemployed person taken as
percentage of GDP per member of the labour force.
• Union Density: It shows the proportion of trade union members as
percentage of total wage and salary earners. This variable alone does
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not give a good idea of the union influence in a country, though, since
in many countries wage negotiations aﬀect workers who are not union
members. That is why we need to include as well the next variable.
• Union Coverage: This variable shows the share of workers actually
aﬀected by union bargaining. It takes three values. 1 means that
only under 25% of workers is covered. 2 means that the percentage of
covered employees is between 25 and 70%. Lastly, 3 means that more
than 70% of workers are eﬀected by union negotiation on wages.
• Wage Bargaining Coordination: In each country the degree of employer
and worker wage bargaining coordination is ranked from a low coordi-
nation index of 1 to a high coordination value of 3.
• Tax burden on labour: This is a crude measure of the tax wedge be-
tween real labour costs and take home pay. It is the sum of the average
payroll, consumption and income tax rates.
We have added to the labour market institutions presented above a proxy
for the minimum wage level in the country. The idea is that the same argu-
ment that applies to start-up costs governs wage floors. That is, the failure to
create enough jobs in the service sector could be due to the existence of wage
floors, which prevented small firms from hiring more people. The proxy is
the ratio of the first percentile of earnings distribution to the fifth percentile
or median. The earnings dispersion data come from the OECD Employment
Outlooks of 1993 and 1996. There is no data for Spain and Ireland, and data
for the rest of the countries is very incomplete. Therefore, any comment has
to be done with caution.
2.1.2 Start-up costs
The OECD has recently published an indicator of product market regula-
tions for 21 OECD countries (excluding the new central and eastern Euro-
pean members, Korea, Mexico and Turkey); unfortunately, only for one year:
1998.8 The data come from responses of OECD countries to an ad hoc ques-
tionnaire and other sources. The information was grouped in the following
regulatory domains:
8For a full description of the data-set see [19].
11
• State control over business enterprises: Overall size of the public en-
terprise sector; existence and extent of special rights over business en-
terprises; legislative control over public enterprises; existence of price
controls; and use of command and control regulations.
• Barriers to entrepreneurship: Features of the licensing and permit sys-
tem; communication and simplification of rules and procedures; admin-
istrative burdens of corporate and sole-proprietors start-ups; industry
specific administrative burdens; scope of legal barriers to entry and
existence of antitrust exemptions for public enterprises.
• Barriers to international trade and investment: Barriers to share-ownership
for non-resident operators; discriminatory procedures in international
trade and competition policies; regulatory barriers to trade; and aver-
age tariﬀs.
To calculate the overall product market regulation index, each coded
indicator was re-scaled to be between 0 and 6. Then the indicators were
aggregated into the summary indicators and finally into the overall indica-
tor weighting each component according to its contribution to the overall
variance in the data (factor analysis methodology).
The ”barriers to entrepreneurship” indicator has three sub-domains: Reg-
ulatory and administrative opacity, barriers to competition, and admin-
istrative burdens on start-ups. The variable ”administrative burdens on
start-ups” is defined as ”administrative burdens for corporations, for sole-
proprietorship and sector specific burdens,” such as those present in the
retail sector. The latter is a variable of interest regarding the current analy-
sis because it includes administrative burdens, not only of corporations but
also of sole-account proprietors, which is the legal form that most start-ups
assume. This is an advantage over other possible data sources such as the
one oﬀered by Djankov et al. [2000]. In that paper the authors gather data
on required procedures governing entry regulation as well as the cost in time
and monetary terms of following those procedures. However, data refer only
to limited liability companies, which is a handicap if what one want to study
is the impact of those procedures on firm creation.
Hence, the OECD sub-domain ”administrative burdens on start-ups” will
be used in the analysis to proxy institutions governing firm creation. Recall
that it is our claim that countries with large administrative burdens on firm
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creation were not able to create enough service jobs to absorb displaced
workers from other economic sectors. However, and for the sake of compari-
son, the analysis will also be done using instead the overall index of product
market regulations.
Figure 4 shows start-up costs in 1998 across OECD countries. Leading
the classification is Italy, followed by France and Spain. The countries where
opening a new business is easiest are UK, USA and Denmark.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Figure 4: Administrative burdens on start-ups, OECD Index [0,6]. 1998
2. 2 Mac ro ec onomi c sho cks
B&W identify three negative macroeconomic shocks, that might have con-
tributed to the increase in unemployment over the last decades: the decline
in total factor productivity growth, the shift in labour demand, or equiva-
lently, the increase in the capital share and, finally, the increase in long-term
interest rate.
The Total Factor Productivity growth is calculated as the growth of the
Solow residual for the business sector scaled by the labour share. From the
early 70s, the TFP growth, specially in Europe, has slowed down. If workers
and firms are slow to adapt to the slower growth of productivity, profits
will decrease, and so will capital accumulation and employment. Capital
shares started increasing in the 1980s in most European countries. There
are two possible reasons. The first possibility ventured by Blanchard [1999]
is a technological change biased to capital. The second one is a decrease
in firms’ labour hoarding (when firms employ too much labour at a given
13
wage), maybe fostered by the historical lose of power of unions within Europe.
Both possibilities lead to a decrease in labour demand and, therefore, to an
increase in unemployment. Finally, the real interest rate, calculated as the
long-term nominal rate on government bonds minus a five-year average of
lagged inflation, has increased steadily since the beginning of the 80s.
Baumol [1967] claimed that the employment shift from non-service to
services observed in the last decades was the result of the diﬀerential pro-
ductivity growth in the diﬀerent economic sectors. To be accurate, one should
focus on the diﬀerential total factor productivity growth in manufacturing and
services, rather than on the diﬀerential labour productivity growth. It is only
total factor productivity changes that one can assume exogenous since labour
productivity depends, among other things, on capital accumulation which is
an endogenous variable.9 Using the OECD International Sector Database to
construct sector TFP rates we have been able to put together an unbalanced
panel of 13 countries, out of the 20 countries under analysis.10 That comes to
around 50 observations when we run the regressions with five-year averages.
Taking into account that there are at least 24 explanatory variables in the
regression, that panel is clearly not suﬃcient to yield something meaningful
about the impact of shocks and institutions.
Since capital stock changes only slowly, labour productivity is much more
cyclical than total factor productivity. Hence one possible way of proceed-
ing is to use a smoothed version of labour productivity as a proxy to total
factor productivity.11 Figure 5 shows the ratio of manufacturing to service
smoothed labour productivity and manufacturing to service total factor pro-
ductivity evolution over time. The former is the average of 18 countries and
the later is the average of 13 countries.
In spite of the diﬀerent number of countries included, the evolution along
time of both variables is similar; hence the regression with the labour produc-
tivity trend instead of the total factor productivity will point approximately
in the right direction. However, we are aware of potential identification prob-
lems. To construct a better panel data-set of sector total factor productivity
9We thank Marc Mündler for intensive discussions about this point.
10We followed the methodology of Bernard and Jones [1996a] and [1996b] to construct
sector TFP rates. They first calculate a base year manufacturing and service TFP, and
then estimate the rest of the years using a Divisia-Tornquist multifactor productivity rate.
11The variable was smoothed using a Hodrick-Prescott filter. We used a lambda equal
to 100 because the data have annual frequence. We also tried with other values such as
10 or 400, also used in the literature, and results did not diﬀer.
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0.91
1.87
Figure 5: Manufacturing to service labour and total factor productivity
will be the next step in our research.
3 Results
The model to be estimated was first suggested by Blanchard [1999] in a Baﬃ
Lecture in Rome titled ”European Unemployment: the Role of Shocks and
Institutions.” In the lecture he defended the interaction between macroe-
conomic shocks with various labour market institutions as the best way to
explain, first the persistence of the impact of shocks on unemployment, and
second, the diverse impact of similar shocks in the OECD countries.
3.1 Common unidentified shocks: a benchmark
3.1.1 Time-constant institutions
To capture those interactions, the simplest model is as follows:
uit =
[
i
αici + dt +
[
j
γj(dt ∗Xji ) + "it (1)
where uit is the dependent variable (unemployment, service or manufacturing
employment rates) in country i at time t, ci are 20 country dummies, dt
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are time dummies, that is, common unidentified shocks12, and Xji is the
time-constant value over the period of the institution j in country i. What
matters in the estimation is not the value of the shock or the institution but
the interaction between both of them. This is the most general specification
since no specific shocks are imposed. Therefore it allows to isolate the impact
of the institutions from that of the shocks on the dependent variables. Hence
it will be used as a benchmark.
Notice that each institution is allowed to interact separately with the same
linear combination of shocks. The model is therefore non-linear.13 B&W
estimate the model using non-linear least squares and do not correct for
heteroscedasticity present in the regression. Although the coeﬃcients are
consistent, and therefore it is legitimate to use them to make estimations,
they are not eﬃcient, that is, with minimum variance, so the standard errors
are not correct. In this paper the model will be estimated using an equivalent
maximum likelihood function which allows for White’s heteroscedasticity-
consistent variances and standard errors.
Autocorrelation is only a problem in the regressions with common shocks,
proxied by time dummies. The deviation from the average of the dependent
variable, unemployment rate or sector employment rates, is clearly cyclical.
In the first set of regressions time dummies are used, so there is nothing
in the right-hand side of expression 1 to account for that cyclical behavior,
hence the error term is autocorrelated. However, autocorrelation is corrected
for when identified shocks instead of time dummies are introduced in the
regression.
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show respectively the results for the unemployment,
service and manufacturing regression. Five year averages have been taken
(with the exception of the last period which only comprises 1995-1997) to
smooth out short-term fluctuations. All institutions are expressed in devia-
tions to the cross-country mean. Wage bargaining coordination and active
labour market policies have been multiplied by (-1) so the expected impact
of all institutions on unemployment is positive. Country and time dummies
12The first period is left out so it becomes the constant. Therefore the country dummies
can be interpreted as the unemployment (or sector employment rates) in the first period.
13We could try to make it linear in the following way,
uit =
S
i αici+dt+γ1β1(d1∗X1i )+γ1β2(d2∗X1i )+γ2β1(d1∗X2i )+γ2β2(d2∗X2i )+...+it
where we have written the example for two time dummies or shocks (d1 and d2 with
coeﬃcients β1 and β2) and two institutions (X1i and X2i with coeﬃcients γ1 and γ2). But
we would then have to impose non-linear restrictions on the coeﬃcients, so γ1β1β1 =
γ1β2
β2
.
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Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
1 2 3 4 5
B. Duration .23 (.04) .26 (.05) .29 (.05) .19 (.04) .29 (.06)
B.R.Rate .02 (.00) .02 (.01) .03 (.01) .00 (.00) .02 (.00)
EPL .05 (.02) .01 (.02) -.01 (.02) .02 (.02) .03 (.02)
U.Density .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01)
Tax Wedge .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .00 (.01) .02 (.01) .02 (.01)
Coordination .26 (.06) .33 (.06) .38 (.05) .12 (.07) .32 (.05)
U.Coverage .07 (.19) .04 (.19) .01 (.19) -.07 (.20) .04 (.21)
ALMP .02 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .02 (.01) .01 (.01)
Start-up costs .38 (.12)
SUC*initial nsv .73 (.16)
Minimum Wage 1.4 (.9)
Product Market Regul. .49 (.17)
Observations 117 117 117 105 117
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 2: Unemployment Regression, common shocks and time-constant in-
stitutions
were included in all regressions.
Five diﬀerent regressions have been run with each dependent variable.
The first one replicates that of B&W. The results are very similar although
not exactly the same since the observation period is not the same. The sec-
ond regression adds to the eight labour market institutions the administrative
burdens on start-ups provided by the OECD (more concretely, the data is
from 1998, which is taken as the time-constant value of the institution). The
third regression substitute start-up costs by the interaction between start-
up costs and the initial non-service employment share of the working age
population. We claim that the combination of large shifts of employment
from non-service to service sector with administrative barriers to firm cre-
ation hampers employment creation, or equivalently, fosters unemployment.
In the fourth regression start-up costs have been substituted by minimum
wages (proxied by the first percentile of the earnings distribution to the me-
dian wage). Regression five includes the overall product market regulation
index.
There is a lot of information in the three tables shown above so let us take
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Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
1 2 3 4 5
B. Duration -.10 (.03) -.12 (.03) -.13 (.03) -.10 (.03) -.10 (.03)
B.R.Rate -.00 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00)
EPL -.03 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.04 (.01)
U.Density -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00) -.01 (.00)
Tax Wedge -.01 (.01) -.00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Coordination -.13 (.04) -.17 (.04) -.17 (.04) -.08 (.06) -.13 (.04)
U.Coverage .19 (.14) .19 (.13) .21 (.13) .15 (.12) .19 (.14)
ALMP -.00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Start-up costs -.21 (.09)
SUC*initial nsv -.32 (.13)
Minimum Wage .87 (.83)
Product Market Regul. .01 (.12)
Observations 117 117 117 105 117
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 3: Service Regression, common shocks and time-constant institutions
Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment ratio
1 2 3 4 5
B. Duration .19 (.06) .24 (.05) .26 (.05) .19 (.06) .24 (.07)
B.R.Rate -.01 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.00)
EPL -.02 (.02) -.08 (.02) -.09 (.02) -.01 (.02) -.03 (.02)
U.Density -.02 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)
Tax Wedge .01 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01)
Coordination -.17 (.07) -.05 (.06) -.07 (.06) -.04 (.06) -.12 (.07)
U.Coverage .02 (.22) .00 (.18) -.03 (.19) -.10 (.19) .01 (.21)
ALMP -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)
Start-up costs .61 (.13)
SUC*initial nsv .86 (.2)
Minimum Wage 2.6 (.85)
Product Market Regul. .41 (.25)
Observations 117 117 117 105 117
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 4: Manufacturing Regression, common shocks and time-constant in-
stitutions
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you slowly through the most interesting results. The first important remark
is that the unemployment and the service results look like two sides of the
same coin. When benefit duration, replacement rate, employment protec-
tion legislation and wage bargaining coordination are positive and significant
in the unemployment regression, they show as negative and significant in
the service regression. This result confirms what the first look at the data
suggested.
Benefit duration is very robust and significant in all regressions. Coun-
tries where unemployed receive long benefits experience more unemployment.
More interesting may be the service and manufacturing regressions. Coun-
tries with longer benefits than average are countries with less service and
more manufacturing employment.
The positive sign of benefit duration, the case is the same for the mini-
mum wage, in the manufacturing regression is a very robust, and interesting,
result. It has been reported before that high and long unemployment bene-
fits increase the reservation wage of workers. A high reservation wage means
that workers are less willing to accept low-paid jobs in the service sector and
prefer instead to queue in the manufacturing sector. Thus, the shift from
non-service to service economy is delayed.
Consequently the negative sign of benefit duration in the service regres-
sion is not surprising. However, there could be something else to the neg-
ative impact of benefits on service employment. The report of the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor of 2001 found that countries with generous un-
employment insurance systems were systematically less ”entrepreneurial”.14
This was explained in the following way: There are two types of start-ups.
One type is the result of a business opportunity and the other type is the
result of desperation, of the need to make a living. Generous benefit systems
are taking away part of the desperation of the unemployed and, therefore,
decreasing the second type of start-ups. Hence, if we accept the intimate con-
nection between start-ups and service sector job creation, generous benefit
systems can be expected to decrease service employment.
Long unemployment benefits and high wage floors are normally the result
of strong union power in the country. The regressions include three bargain-
ing related variables: union density, union coverage and wage bargaining
14The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor is an international project led by Paul Reynolds
(Babson College and the London Business School) aimed at measuring entrepreneurship
across countries in a comparable way. See www.gemconsortium.org.
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coordination. The first remarkable fact is the lack of significance over all
specifications of union coverage. The second remark is that both union den-
sity and wage bargaining coordination aﬀect significantly service employment
and unemployment, and are relatively unimportant in explaining manufac-
turing employment. This result is consistent with the observed impact of
benefits and minimum wages: unionized countries have higher union pre-
mium, i.e. the relative wage in manufacturing is higher, which means that
migration to the service sector has been slower.
Start-up costs, and the overall index of product market regulations, have a
consistent positive and significant sign in the unemployment regression. The
variable star-up costs is also negative in the service regression and positive in
the manufacturing regression. Countries where starting a business is cumber-
some have paid in terms of service employment, and of unemployment. The
results are reinforced when instead of start-up costs we run the regression
with the interaction of start-up costs with initial non-service employment.
Start-up costs have a higher impact when the 1970 share of population of
working age outside the service sector is larger. In other words, countries that
had to go a long way from non-service to service economies paid a higher price
in terms of unemployment for institutions that delayed the sectorial shift.
The impact of the overall index of product market regulations, however,
diﬀers from the one of start-up costs in both sector employment regressions.
It is not significant in the service regression and it is significant only at 11%
significance level (although positive, as the start-up costs) in the manufactur-
ing one. Recall that the overall OECD index groups regulations that cover
a much wider range of economic activities than start-up costs, such as state
control over the private sector, barriers to international trade or existence of
anti-trust exemptions for public enterprises. Some of those domains are not,
or negatively, correlated to start-up costs so they are capturing diﬀerent phe-
nomena.15 Since service employment takes place at small local firms, some
of the regulations included in the overall index do not apply, which could
explain the non-significance of the variable in the service regression.
When start-up costs (or the interaction term) are included in the unem-
ployment regression, several labour market institution variables drop. Most
dramatic is the eﬀect of start-up costs on employment protection legislation.
15For example, barriers to trade and start-up costs have a correlation coeﬃcient equal
to (-.03). The two sub-domain of barriers to entrepreneurship, ”administrative opcity”
and ”administrative burdens on start-ups,” have a correlation coeﬃcient of (-.17).
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Coeﬃcients Range of variation Implied range
from Table 2, of institution of eﬀect of shock
Variable column (2) minimum maximum minimum maximum
Time eﬀect .07
B. Duration .26 -1.93 1.57 -.50 .41
B.R. Rate .02 -46.35 32.65 -1.11 .78
U.Density .02 -30.98 39.02 -.52 .65
Coordination .33 -2.05 1.95 -.68 .65
Start-up costs .38 -1.49 2.80 -.57 1.07
Note: Only coeﬃcients significant at 10% are included in table
Table 5: Estimated impact of institutions on unemployment after a common
shock
Once start-up costs are introduced, EPL does not show up as significant
again. This is so in almost all specifications we tried and therefore very ro-
bust, and is consistent with evidence based on job flows. The high correlation
between start-up costs and EPL (correlation coeﬃcient of 0.73) may explain
the significance of EPL in other aggregate studies. When minimum wages
are included, instead of start-up costs, EPL reappears as significant, which
seems to confirm the previous remark.
To give an idea of the magnitude of the coeﬃcients, Table 5 reproduces
in its second column the estimation results for the model of unemployment
with start-up costs (Table 2, regression 2). The third column of the table
shows the variation range of each independent variable. The variation is in
terms of deviations to the cross-country mean, which is taken as reference
point. The fourth column shows the impact of the same shock on the country
with the ”best” and the ”worst” institutional setting, i.e. on the countries
with the largest -negative and positive- deviations to the cross-country mean.
For example, Denmark is the country with the lowest start-up costs and
Italy the one with the ”worst” or largest value of the institution among all
countries in the sample. The estimations indicate that the time dummy
would increase unemployment by 7% in a country with the average value
of all institutions. The country with the highest start-up costs would have
an additional -relative to the country with average start-up costs- increase
in unemployment of 1.07%. Denmark, however, would see an increase in
unemployment 0.57% smaller than the country with the average value of
start-up costs.
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Unemployment: common shocks Belgium Italy Japan UK USA
Actual increase, 1970-97 12% 8% 2% 5% 0%
Predicted increase, 1970-97 14.7% 6.1% 1.7% 7.8% 0.1%
Percentage explained by time 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
(given average institutions)
Percentage explained by institutions 7.7% -0.9% -5.3% 0.8% -6.9%
Benefit system 3.3% -11.3% -3.1% -0.6% -4.7%
EPL 0.5% 0.8% -0.2% -0.3% -0.8%
Union activity 1.1% 1% -2.2% 4.4% 1.1%
Tax Wedge 0.1% 0.9% -0.9% -0.3% -0.3%
ALMP 0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 0.3% 0.8%
Start-up Costs 2.4% 7.5% 0.5% -2.7% -3%
Table 6: Predicted increase in unemployment: contribution of institutions
Take the case of a particular country, for example Italy. The average un-
employment rate in the first period of analysis, 1970-1975, was of 4%. During
the last period, 1995-1997, the average rate was 12%. Hence unemployment
increased 8 percentage points over the period of analysis. The model with
common shocks and time-constant institutions predicts an unemployment
increase of 6.1% in that same period. As the table above shows, 7 percent-
age points of that predicted increase are due to time shocks. The remaining
responds to the Italian specific institutional framework. Table 6 shows the
contribution to the predicted change in unemployment of each of the insti-
tutions analyzed in the paper for Italy and other four OECD countries.
Benefit duration and replacement rates have been merged into ”Benefit
system” and union coverage, union density and wage bargaining coordination
conform the institution ”Union activity.” Following with the example of
Italy, it is known that Italy barely had an unemployment benefit system
at all for most of the postwar period, hence the negative contribution to
the unemployment increase over the period. Union activity, employment
protection legislation, the tax wedge and active labour market policies have
all marginally contributed to the unemployment rise in Italy, according to our
estimations. The single institution that can explain a substantial increase in
Italian unemployment is start-up costs.
Turning to the remarkable unemployment performance of the United
States, very well predicted by the model, we can see that it is almost entirely
due to the lower than average benefit system and start-up costs. Belgium is
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the opposite case: its bad unemployment records are due to unemployment
benefits and start-up costs well above the OECD average.
Hence, according to the model with common shocks and time-constant
institutions, the two single labour market institutions that have contributed
the most to the explanation of the diverse OECD unemployment evolution
are the benefit system (benefit duration and replacement rate) and the start-
up costs of firms.
3.2 Identified shocks
We now turn to identify those shocks that before were left unidentified and
captured by time dummies. The model to be estimated is as follows:
uit =
[
i
ci +
[
k
βkSkit +
[
j
γj(
[
k
βkSkit ∗Xji ) + "it (2)
where Skit is shock k in country i at time t. One can think about a
composite of shocks that interacts with the labour market institutions. There
are several candidates for ”bad” shocks that might be responsible for the
observed increase in unemployment in the OECD countries in the last three
decades.
Blanchard [1999] and then B&W identify three of those shocks: a slow-
down in the total factor productivity growth; an increase in the long-term
real interest rate; and finally, an increase in the capital share, or equivalently,
a negative shift of labour demand. The focus of this paper is on sector diﬀer-
ential productivity growth rather than on aggregate productivity slowdown.
It is argued that manufacturing and service diﬀerential productivity growth
is behind the observed employment shift to the service sector in developed
economies. We claim that countries that did not have friendly institutions
to service job creation were not able to absorb displaced workers from other
sectors which resulted in higher unemployment.
To test that claim, the first of B&W shocks, aggregate TFP growth, is
substituted by the manufacturing to service TFP. Then the interaction of
shocks with the labour market institutions and start-up costs is used as ex-
planatory variables in the unemployment and sector employment regressions.
Sector TFP is proxied by the ”filtered” sector labour productivity or
labour productivity trend, as we explained with some detail in the section
dedicated to the description of the data. In general terms the first and last
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Dependent variable: Unemployment rate
1 2 3 4
Labour Demand Shift .09 (.07 ) .07 (.05) .09 (.06) .05 (.06)
LR interest rate .04 (.09) .04 (.09) .03 (.09) .05 (.09)
Manufacturing to service L.Prod. .07 (.01) .07 (.01) .07 (.01) .08 (.01)
B. Duration .26 (.11) .35 (.11) .29 (.11) .44 (.12)
B.R.Rate -.02 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01)
EPL .02 (.04) -.12 (.08) .04 (.04) -.09 (.06)
U.Density .04 (.01) .05 (.01) .05 (.01) .02 (.01)
Tax Wedge -.03 (.02) -.05 (.02) -.03 (.02) -.03 (.01)
Coordination .09 (.21) .19 (.19) .10 (.18) .04 (.18)
U.Coverage -.26 (.42) -.32 (.43) -.07 (.44) -.11 (.38)
ALMP -.00 (-01) -.03 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.03 (.01)
Start-up costs .97 (.52)
Minimum Wage -4.2 (2.1)
Product Market Regulation 1.5 (.68)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 83 74 83 92
Observations 78 78 76 78
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 7: Unemployment Regression: Identified shocks and time-constant
institutions
period of data are missing for all countries, Ireland and Switzerland drop
totally and Spain has only two periods of data available. Our data set is
therefore badly reduced (from 106 to 78 observation in the best case) so the
results of the estimations have to be taken with caution.
Tables 7, 8 and 9 show the estimation results of the model with three
identified shocks, labour demand shift, long-term interest rate, and manufac-
turing to service labour productivity, and time-constant institutions. Column
(1) shows the estimation of the model only with labour market institutions,
column (2) includes start-up costs, column (3) substitutes start-up costs by
minimum wages, and column (4) includes the OECD overall index of product
market regulation, in place of the administrative burdens on start-ups.
All the three shocks are entered in levels and can be interpreted as de-
viations to the value in the first period of analysis, or as deviations to the
country average. A Wald test to test for their joint significance has been
performed and in all cases we can reject the hypotheses of all coeﬃcients
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Dependent variable: Service employment ratio
1 2 3 4
Labour Demand Shift .16 (.07) .26 (.13) .15 (.07) .20 (.09)
LR interest rate .29 (.11) .30 (.14) .28 (.11) .29 (.12)
Manufacturing to service L.Prod. .16 (.01) .16 (.01) .17 (.02) .15 (.02)
B. Duration -.09 (.04) -.12 (.04) -.07 (.05) -.14 (.05)
B.R.Rate .00 (.00) -.01 (.01) .00 (.02) .00 (.00)
EPL -.03 (.02) .07 (.03) -.03 (.02) .00 (.04)
U.Density -.01 (.01) -.01 (.00) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Tax Wedge -.01 (.01) .00 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01 (.01)
Coordination .09 (.11) .00 (.09) .08 (.13) .07 (.11)
U.Coverage -.11 (.29) -.05 (.29) -.02 (.32) -.18 (.32)
ALMP .00 (.01) .02 (.01) .00 (.01) .01 (.01)
Start-up costs -.66 (.26)
Minimum Wage -2.0 (2.6)
Product Market Regulation -.50 (.39)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 278 328 183 278
Observations 78 78 76 78
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 8: Service Regression: Identified shocks and time-constant institutions
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Dependent variable: Manufacturing employment ratio
1 2 3 4
Labour Demand Shift .03 (.05) .04 (.05) .03 (.05) .05 (.05)
LR interest rate -.05 (.08) -.05 (.08) -.06 (.09) -.05 (.08)
Manufacturing to service L.Prod. -.12 (.01) -.12 (.01) -.12 (.01) -.12 (.01)
B. Duration .11 (.06) .13 (.07) .11 (.06) .17 (.07)
B.R.Rate -.02 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01)
EPL -.03 (.01) -.07 (.03) -.04 (.01) -.07 (.03)
U.Density .00 (.01) .00 (.01) -.00 (.01) -.00 (.01)
Tax Wedge -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01) -.02 (.01)
Coordination .07 (.13) .11 (.10) .09 (.14) .07 (.12)
U.Coverage .22 (.19) .22 (.18) .24 (.23) .24 (.19)
ALMP -.03 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.03 (.01) -.04 (.01)
Start-up costs .21 (.22)
Minimum Wage .29 (1.1)
Product Market Regulation .41 (.36)
Wald Test (3 shocks) 165 162 143 164
Observations 78 78 76 78
Notes: Standard errors in brackets.
When minimum wages are introduced, Ireland and Spain drop.
Table 9: Manufacturing Regression: Identified shocks and time-constant in-
stitutions
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being zero.
The first remarkable thing is that the labour demand shift and the long-
term interest rate are not significant in the unemployment and manufacturing
regressions when sector labour productivity is controlled for.16 On the other
hand, the manufacturing to service labour productivity is always very signif-
icant (t-statistics of about 10 in absolute value). That shock is positive in
the unemployment regression, positive in the service regression and negative
in the manufacturing regression. All signs are as expected since, according to
Baumol [1967], the increase in manufacturing productivity relative to service
caused the shift of employment from non-service to service sectors. Hence
it explains the increase in service employment and the decrease in manu-
facturing employment. The second remarkable issue is to be found in the
service regression. It has been mentioned that the increase in manufacturing
to service labour productivity increases significantly service employment, as
expected. The striking thing is that the two other shocks included in the
analysis, labour demand shift and increase in the interest rate, also increase
significantly service employment. The most likely explanation is the exis-
tence of a spurious relationship between the growth in service employment
and the growth in the capital share and interest rate.
Turning directly to the administrative burdens on start-ups, the focus of
this paper, we observe the following. The coeﬃcient of start-up costs is higher
than with unidentified shocks in all regressions. It is positive and significant
at 10% significance level in the unemployment regression, very significant
and negative, in the service regression, and positive but non-significant in
the manufacturing regression. What these results are telling us is that the
shift of employment from non-service to service activities had a very high
cost in terms of service employment, reflected in overall unemployment, in
countries where starting a business is more cumbersome than average.
The beauty is that when the regression is run with the aggregate TFP
growth, as in Blanchard and Wolfers [2000], there is no evidence that coun-
tries with more administrative burdens on firm creation than the average
have a worse service employment performance.17 Burdens on firm creation
16When aggregate TFP growth is included instead, the long-term interest rate is signif-
icant in all regressions. Labour demand shift is close to significance at 10% level in the
unemployment regression. B&W found the labour demand shift to be significant. However
when heteroscedasticity is controlled for, the labour demand shift loses its significance.
17The estimations with aggregate TFP growth, instead of sector diﬀerential labour pro-
ductivity growth, are available in [14].
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become significant only when interacted with a shock that caused the relo-
cation of large numbers of workers in the service sector.
When the overall product market regulation index is included instead of
start-up costs, the results change slightly. Product market regulations, when
interacted with the sector diﬀerential productivity, increase significantly un-
employment (this result is more significant than when start-up costs were
included). The diﬀerence, as it was the case when regressions were run with
time dummies, is to be found in the service regression, where product market
regulations have a non-significant negative coeﬃcient.
Countries with longer benefits than average create less jobs in the service
sector (where the private initiative is very important), have a larger share
of the working age population employed in the manufacturing firms and
experience, in general, higher unemployment than an average country.
With respect to the rest of the institutions, the most remarkable changes
from before are as follow. First, EPL is non-significant from the beginning in
the unemployment regression (before it was significant when start-up costs
were excluded). In the service regression, EPL goes from being negative and
significant without start-up costs to positive and significant when they are
included. When minimum wages are controlled for instead, the sign is again
negative (although non-significant). Therefore the behavior observed before,
when the EPL index systematically dropped out when start-up costs were
introduced, is here amplified.
To get a feeling of the contribution of the three shocks analyzed in the
section to the increase in unemployment, let us take a look in more detail to
Italy —a country that has experienced a large relocation of workers into the
service sector. The predicted rise of Italian unemployment over the period
is of 7.25%, much closer to the actual 8% than the predicted increase of the
model with common unidentified shocks. Of those 7.25 percentage points,
shocks (given average institutions) can explain a rise equal to 5.7% and insti-
tutions explain the remaining 1.5%. The shift of employment to the service
sector explains alone 5% points of the 5.7% corresponding to the shocks.
The large contribution of that shock is a feature of every country; in av-
erage it accounts for around 60% of the total predicted change in unemploy-
ment. That figure is quite close to the one given by Marimon and Zilibotti
[1998], who calculated that almost 80% of the long-run employment diﬀer-
ential growth across countries and industries is accounted by diﬀerent initial
distribution of labour across industries and only 20% by country eﬀects.
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Unemployment: Identified shocks Belgium Italy Japan UK USA
Actual increase, 1970-97 12% 8% 2% 5% 0%
Predicted increase, 1970-97 10% 7.3% 1% 4.4% -0.2%
Percentage explained by shocks 5.2% 5.7% 1.5% 2.8% 3%
(given average institutions)
Labour Demand Shift -0.3% 0.4% -0.1% -0.3% 0.4%
Long-term Interest Rate 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Manufacturing to service productivity 5.4% 5.1% 1.5% 3% 2.5%
Percentage explained by institutions 4.8% 1.5% -0.5% 1.7% -3.2%
Benefit system 2.8% -3.2% -1.1% 1.6% -2%
EPL* -4.1% -6.6% 0.5% 1.1% 3.4%
Union Activity* 2.3% -0.3% -1% 1.2% -1.3%
Tax wedge -0.2% -3.4% 1% 0.7% 0.7%
ALMP -0.3% -0.4% -0.2% -0.2% -0.7%
Start-up costs 4.4% 15.3% 0.3% -2.8% -3.3%
Institutions with * are non-significant at 10% significance level
Table 10: Predicted increase in unemployment: contribution of shocks and
institutions
We turn now to the contribution of the diﬀerent institutions to the unem-
ployment increase over the period, for Italy and five other OECD countries.
Table 10 shows that the predictive power of the regression with identified
shocks and time-constant institutions is generally better than the one with
common shocks.
The figures in the table have to be taken with extreme caution: employ-
ment protection legislation is non-significantly diﬀerent from zero and has
reverse sign. So are two of the three variables included in the union activity
group. Of the rest of significant variables, ALMP and the tax wedge have a
negative sign in the regression, instead of the expected positive one.
There is a general decrease in the contribution to the unemployment
change of the benefit system (i.e. in Italy, now the figure is -3.2%, compared
to the -11.28% in the regression with common unidentified shocks) now that
shocks have been identified. Secondly, the contribution of start-up costs,
now that are interacted with identified shocks, to the unemployment rise is
very large. That contribution is two times as large as the already important
contribution of start-up costs when shocks were not specified in Italy and
Belgium, and approximately the same in Japan, UK and USA.
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Taking the results with caution due to the numerous missing values in the
data-set, start-up costs emerge as a relevant variable to explain unemploy-
ment given the shift of employment from non-services to services experienced
by most western economies over the last decades.
3.3 Time-varying institutions
We have also run the regressions with common shocks and time-varying in-
stitutions. The data come from N&N.1819 There are at least three problems
with those regressions, though. First, there are comparable start-up cost data
across OECD countries for one year only, 1998. Moreover, there are so many
missing values in the measure of minimum wages that it would be advisable
to use the time-constant value of minimum wage instead of the time-varying
one. Therefore, start-up costs and the wage floor are time-constant while
all the rest of the variables are time-varying (although some do not vary
that much). The second, smaller, drawback is that time-varying data are
available only for six labour market institutions, instead of the eight used
above. Union coverage and active labour market policies are left out of the
time-varying analysis. Given that the explanatory variables are not entirely
independent one of another, this omission could aﬀect the results.
Last but not least, institutions change very slowly over time so the value
of one institution in a country at a certain period is certainly correlated
with the value of the same institution at the previous or posterior period.
This means that the institutions’ coeﬃcients could be biased. Indeed, one
general feature of all regressions using time-varying data on institutions is
that the estimated coeﬃcients are larger, sometimes much larger, than those
estimated with time-constant institutions. We suspect that this problem
could be behind some change of signs. Hence, all interpretations have to be
done with caution.
The tables and a more detailed analysis are available in Lopez-Garcia
[2003]. The unemployment and manufacturing regressions replicate in gen-
18Although the definition and construction of the variables in N&N are very similar
to the ones in B&W, there are slight diﬀerences. Maybe the most important one is the
construction of the benefit duration index. B&W use the number of years of entitle-
ment. N&N use a weighted average of the replacement rates at diﬀerent moments of the
unemployment spell.
19We have run the regressions with yearly data (485 observations) and five-year average
periods as before. The results are very similar in both cases.
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eral terms those using time-constant institutions. The service regression
presents some changes. The benefit replacement rate and EPL, which were
significantly decreasing service employment with time-constant institutions,
are now positive and, in some regressions, significant. There are three possi-
ble explanations to the positive sign of EPL and benefit replacement rate: the
time evolution of both variables has been favorable to service job creation;
there is a spurious relationship between the rise in service employment and
the rise in both institutions; or there is a problem of biased coeﬃcients.
To include in the analysis the variation over time of labour and product
market institutions is necessary. This is only a first attempt in that direction,
which shows that the main results obtained with time-constant institutions
are robust. But better data and further econometric work are called for.
4 Conclusion
The focus of this paper has been on a macroeconomic shock surprisingly
neglected in the literature, namely, the diﬀerential productivity growth in
the manufacturing and the service sector. The importance of that shock is
that it helps to explain the observed employment shift from non-services to
the service sector. We argue that countries that had unfriendly institutions
to service job creation were not able to have a smooth transition towards a
service economy with the result of higher unemployment. Given the charac-
teristics of the service employment, created in small firms at the local level,
one institution that possibly hampered service employment is the adminis-
trative burdens on firm creation. Thus the second contribution of the paper
is to include in the analysis, along with the usual suspects, the start-up costs
of firms.
The estimations seem to support the working hypotheses of the paper:
countries with higher start-up costs have significantly lower service employ-
ment and higher unemployment. This is so when no shocks are specified, and
time dummies are included instead, and when the shocks are identified and
include the diﬀerential productivity growth in manufacturing and services.
The first set of regressions use time dummies instead of fully specified
shocks to be able to isolate the impact of the institutions from that of shocks
on unemployment. The time dummies alone would be able to explain an
increase in unemployment of 7 percentage points in a country with the cross-
country average value of institutions. The country with the highest start-up
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costs among all OECD countries, Italy, would be penalized with an addi-
tional increase in unemployment of 1.07%. When the contribution of each
institution to the predicted increase in unemployment is estimated for the
case of Italy, start-up costs emerge as the largest contributor to the unem-
ployment rise. On the other hand, employment protection legislation, one
of the traditional main suspects, appears to have contributed in less than 1
percentage point to the overall increase.
Among the three macroeconomic shocks included in the analysis, shift in
labour demand, increase in the interest rate and change in the manufacturing
to service labour productivity, the only significant one is the latter. Again
looking at the case of Italy, it has been estimated that the shift of employment
to the service sector can explain alone 5 percentage points of the overall
predicted increase in unemployment, which accounts for around 60% of the
total. The other two shocks together can hardly explain one percent of the
unemployment increase.
The analysis of the contribution of each institution, when interacted with
the shocks, has to be taken with extreme caution given the restricted sample
size. Still, start-up costs emerge again as the institution that has contributed
the most to the predicted unemployment increase. In the case of Italy, that
contribution is now twice as large as it was when no shocks were specified
and time dummies were used instead.
In spite of the incomplete data on sector labour productivity, the analysis
shows that the administrative burdens on firm creation and other product
market regulations can be blamed for part of the increase in unemployment
experienced by most western economies in the last three decades. That
impact is specially important when the size of the employment shift from the
agriculture and industry sector into the service sector is taken into account.
Spain, Italy or France are countries with unfriendly institutions when it
comes to service job creation. Thus, policy intervention in this respect could
potentially have an important impact on their labour market performance.
Further work is needed to improve the data-set, with better sector TFP
data and time-varying information on start-up costs.
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